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Recent studies document significant persis-
tence for a number of societal characteristics 
including economic outcomes like female labor 
force participation (Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 
forthcoming), levels of technology (Comin, 
Easterly, and Gong 2010), and cultural traits (Voigtländer and Voth 2012). This paper con-
tributes to this line of enquiry by analyzing the 
persistence of institutional features over time. In 
particular, we examine the persistence of democ-
racy, showing that a tradition of local-level 
democracy—i.e., a tradition of having the local 
leader chosen through consensus rather than 
other methods such as hereditary appointment—
is associated with more democratic national 
institutions. This is consistent both with the per-
sistence of democratic institutions over time and 
with the transmission of democratic institutions 
from the local level to the national level.
We provide evidence on mechanisms, show-
ing that past experience with local-level democ-
racy is associated with more supportive beliefs of 
national democracy today. This finding suggests 
the possibility that a tradition of village-level 
democracy may affect people’s attitudes about 
the appropriateness of democratic institutions, 
which in turn affect the stability of such institu-
tions at the national level. In places where dem-
ocratic institutions existed traditionally at the 
local level, it was natural for these institutions to 
be extended to the national level.  National-level 
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democracy was more likely to be viewed as nat-
ural and legitimate by the population and was 
more likely to remain once implemented.
Lastly, we show that countries with a past 
experience of local democracy also have a stron-
ger rule of law, less corruption, and higher per 
capita income today.
Our analysis uses data from the Ancestral 
Characteristics Database recently constructed 
by Giuliano and Nunn (2013). The database 
provides measures of a variety of characteristics 
of the ancestors of the world’s current popula-
tions. The data, reported at the country, district, 
and grid-cell levels, are constructed by com-
bining preindustrial ethnographic information 
on over 100 ancestral characteristics for 1,265 
ethnic groups with information on the current 
distribution of approximately 7,000 language 
groups reported at the grid-cell level.1 The data-
base uses the languages and dialects spoken by 
current populations to construct measures of the 
characteristics of their ancestors.
These findings complement existing evi-
dence about the importance of traditional state-
level institutions (Bockstette, Chanda, and 
Putterman 2002; Gennaioli and Rainer 2007; 
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou forthcoming). 
While these studies examine the development 
of the nation-state in the past, our analysis con-
siders local-level institutions (i.e., institutions 
at the village level) and their relationship with 
contemporary national-level institutions.
1 For each ethnicity, information is generally coded from 
the earliest period for which satisfactory ethnographic data 
are available or can be reconstructed. For all groups in the 
dataset, the variables are based on the societies prior to 
industrialization. In total, 23 ethnicities are observed during 
the seventeenth century or earlier, 16 during the eighteenth 
century, 310 during the nineteenth century, 876 between 
1900 and 1950, and 31 after 1950. For nine ethnicities an 
exact year is not provided. See Giuliano and Nunn (2013) 
for further details. 
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Our finding that a tradition of local democ-
racy is associated with national democracy 
today is consistent with the arguments and find-
ings from Persson and Tabellini (2009). The 
authors show that a history of democracy (at the 
national level) is associated with the persistence 
of democracy (also at the national level). Their 
explanation for this fact is that past experience 
with democracy facilitates the development of 
democratic capital, measured by a nation’s his-
torical experience with democracy, which is 
beneficial for maintaining democracy.
I. Data
Our analysis uses information on countries’ 
ancestral characteristics taken from Giuliano 
and Nunn’s (2013) Ancestral Characteristics 
Database. The database is constructed by com-
bining information from the Ethnographic 
Atlas (a worldwide ethnicity-level database 
of preindustrial characteristics constructed by 
George Peter Murdock containing information 
for 1,265 ethnic groups) with information on 
over 7,000 languages and dialects spoken by the 
world’s current populations, constructed from 
the sixteenth edition of the Ethnologue and the 
Landscan 2000 dataset.2 While information on 
the characteristics of populations’ ancestors is 
available at many levels of observation—e.g., 
country, district, grid-cell, etc.—for this analy-
sis, we use only the country-level averages.
Our variable of interest is the extent of vil-
lage-level democracy traditionally (i.e., dur-
ing the pre-industrial period) practiced by the 
ancestors of those living in a country. The infor-
mation was originally recorded in the variable 
v72 of the Ethnographic Atlas. The variable 
reports the traditional form of succession of the 
local headman (or close equivalent such as clan 
chief). The categories recorded in the data are: 
patrilineal heir, matrilineal heir; appointment 
by a higher authority; seniority or age; influ-
ence, wealth, or social status; formal consensus (including elections); and informal consensus. 
The variable is used in Whatley (forthcoming), 
2 The Ethnologue provides a shape file that divides the 
word’s land into polygons, with each polygon indicating the 
location of a specific language as of the date of publication, 
while Landscan 2000 reports estimates of the world’s popu-
lation in 2000 for 30 arc-second (roughly 1 km by 1 km) 
grid-cells globally. 
where he shows that within West Africa the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade adversely affected 
local democracy.
To construct a country-level average for the 
level of traditional local democracy, we define 
an ancestral ethnic group as having a tradition 
of democracy if the appointment of the local 
headman was through either formal consensus 
or informal consensus. The country-level mea-
sure we use is, thus, the fraction of individuals in 
each country with ancestors for which the local 
headman was elected through a democratic pro-
cess, defined as either formal or informal con-
sensus. We call this variable Local democracyc. 
An alternative coding is to code only formal 
consensus (i.e., elections) as being democratic. 
All of the results we present are robust to this 
alternative coding.
Figure 1 reports a map showing the nature of 
traditional succession of the local leaders among 
the ancestors of different populations across the 
world. The underlying data are reported at the 
1 km by 1 km grid-cell level and the measure var-
ies across language/dialect groups. The two prac-
tices that we define as traditionally democratic are 
shown in a darker shade, while all other practices 
are shown as light grey. Parts of the world that are 
uninhabited and populations for which data are 
missing are both shown as white.
The map reveals significant variation in the 
presence of democratic village institutions in 
the past. The continents with the lowest pres-
ence of traditional democracy are Africa and 
South America. The mean of Local democracyc 
within the two regions is 0.18 and 0.22, respec-
tively. The region with the greatest presence 
of local democracy is Europe, where the mean 
of Local democracyc is 0.59. The intermediate 
regions of North America, Oceania, and Asia 
have means Local democracyc equal to 0.31, 
0.31, and 0.33, respectively. In addition, we 
also observe substantial heterogeneity within 
regions. For example, within Africa there are 
countries with no tradition of democracy at the 
local level (like Rwanda, Botswana, Eritrea, 
Gambia, and several others) and countries, like 
Somalia, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia, who all 
have a measure of Local democracyc greater 
than 0.90.
Motivated by the high prevalence of local 
democracy within Europe and its offshoots, in 
our analysis, we control for the proportion of a 
country’s population with European ancestry, 
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taken from Nunn and Puga (2012).3 We want 
to be sure that our estimates are not simply 
reflecting the uniqueness of Western Europe 
that has been previously documented (Easterly 
and Levine 2012). Figure 1 also suggests the 
possibility that societies with better land qual-
ity are more likely to have a tradition of local 
democracy. These geographic characteristics 
could potentially have an independent effect 
on our outcomes of interest. Therefore, we 
also control for the proportion of ancestral land 
that is suitable for cultivation. The measure 
is taken from Giuliano and Nunn (2013) and 
is constructed using the historical centroid of 
each ethnic group. Land within a 200-kilome-
ter radius of the centroid is used to construct 
the measure. The final variable that we include 
is the average year of observation and data col-
lection for the ancestors of a given country. In 
the Ethnographic Atlas, ethnic groups without 
written records or with later external contact 
tend to have information from more recent time 
periods. See Giuliano and Nunn (2013) for a 
more detailed discussion.
3 The authors use Putterman and Weil’s (2010) World 
Migration Matrix to construct this variable. 
II. Estimation Results
A. Democratic Institutions
The first outcome we examine is a country’s 
average level of democracy during three 50-year 
intervals between 1850 and 2000. The level of 
democracy is measured by the polity2 variable 
taken from the Polity IV database. This variable 
takes on integer values and ranges from −10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy). Country-level OLS estimates are 
reported in Table 1. In columns 1–3 the depen-
dent variables are the average annual democ-
racy measures during each 50-year period from 
1850–2000. The number of observations in the 
four specifications differs because of the increas-
ing number of independent countries and the 
wider availability of data over time. Column 4 
reports estimates from a pooled regression (three 50-year periods) that includes period 
fixed effects, and with standard errors clustered 
at the country level.
The estimates show that a tradition of 
democracy at the village level is associated 
with more democratic national institutions 
in more recent time periods. This finding is 
consistent with the argument made in Persson 
and Tabellini (2009) that past experience with 
democracy has a positive impact on how well 
current institutions function, which, in turn, 
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Forms of succession
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Patrilineal heir
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Figure 1. Succession to the Office of the Local Headman or Clan Chief
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affects current income. Our results suggest 
that past experience, even at the local level, 
may have beneficial impacts.
One concern with the estimates from columns 
1–4 of Table 1 is that the coefficient for the mea-
sure of traditional democracy may simply reflect 
a relationship between political development in 
the past and political development today. If 
democratic local institutions are correlated 
with the development of a state outside of the 
local community, then our results may simply 
reflect the relationship between past and cur-
rent political development shown by Gennaioli 
and Rainer (2007) and Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou (forthcoming). Therefore, in 
columns 5–8 we re-estimate the specifica-
tions from columns 1–4 but controlling for the 
ancestral measure of the average number of 
jurisdictional hierarchies beyond the local com-
munity, the most commonly used measure of 
state development from the Ethnographic Atlas (e.g., Gennaioli and Rainer 2007; Nunn 2008; 
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou forthcoming). 
We find that the importance of local democratic 
institutions is robust to controlling for the mea-
sure of ancestral state development. In addition, 
we find no relationship between state develop-
ment and subsequent democracy.
Our estimates also show that European ances-
try is also highly correlated with  democracy. 
This is consistent with the findings from 
Easterly and Levine (2012) that show a link 
between European ancestry and contemporary 
development. Interestingly, while the impor-
tance of traditional local democracy appears 
to be decreasing over time, the importance of 
European ancestry is increasing over time.
B. Support for Democracy
A potential explanation for the link between 
a tradition of village democracy and the pres-
ence of national democracy today is that past 
experience with local democracy may have an 
effect on people’s views about the desirabil-
ity of democracy at the national level. A tra-
dition of democracy at the village level may 
generate support for and trust in democratic 
institutions, which are important foundations 
for a well-functioning democracy (Almond 
and Verba 1963). We test for this by examin-
ing individual-level attitudes about democracy 
Table 1—The Determinants of Democracy: Country-Level OLS Estimates
Dependent variable
Polity2, 
1850–1899
Polity2, 
1900–1949
Polity2, 
1950–1999
Polity2, 
1850–1999
Polity2, 
1850–1899
Polity2, 
1900–1949
Polity2, 
1950–1999
Polity2, 
1850–1999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean of dependent variable −2.003 −0.474 −0.631 −0.824 −2.003 −0.474 −0.631 −0.824
Traditional local 3.573** 2.950* 2.018 2.495** 3.642** 3.183** 2.286* 2.755**
 democracy (1.467) (1.484) (1.287) (1.127) (1.689) (1.514) (1.275) (1.123)
Agricultural −3.205 1.236 2.079 1.252 −3.215 1.211 2.046 1.242
 suitability (3.980) (3.331) (1.845) (1.764) (4.057) (3.306) (1.832) (1.740)
Year sampled 1.303*** 0.509 0.676 0.724 1.273** 0.381 0.508 0.586
(0.439) (0.547) (0.784) (0.503) (0.549) (0.558) (0.784) (0.507)
Population of European 0.023 0.049** 0.066*** 0.054*** 0.023 0.050** 0.069*** 0.055***
 descent (0.024) (0.021) (0.013) (0.012) (0.025) (0.021) (0.013) (0.012)
Political hierarchies 0.051 0.228 0.412 0.290
(0.428) (0.420) (0.305) (0.255)
50-year group FEs No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 46 73 148 267 46 73 148 267
R2 0.21 0.25 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.25 0.32 0.27
Notes: The unit of analysis is a country. “Traditional local democracy” is the estimated proportion of citizens whose ancestors appointed their 
local headman through either formal consensus or informal consensus. The variable ranges from 0 to 1, with mean 0.454 and standard deviation 
0.443. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns 4 and 8, time period fixed effects are included and the 
standard errors are clustered at the country level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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taken from the integrated data file of the World 
Values Survey (WVS), a compilation of national 
surveys on values and beliefs on a wide variety 
of topics.4
We examine three outcome variables based 
on three questions that measure respondents’ 
attitudes towards democracy. The first variable, 
democracy better, is based on a question that 
asked respondents whether they agreed with 
the following statement: “Democracy may 
have problems but it is better than any other 
form of government.” Respondents answered 
using the following four-point scale: strongly 
disagree (taking the value of 1), disagree (2), 
agree (3), and strongly agree (4). The second 
4 The integrated data file has five waves, conducted in 
1981–1984, 1989–1993, 1994–1999, 1999–2004, and 
2005–2008. The countries included in the survey vary by 
wave. 
measure, democratic political system, is based 
on respondents’ expressed opinion (on a scale 
from 1 to 4) about whether having a demo-
cratic political system is very good (4), fairly 
good (3), fairly bad (2) or very bad (1). The 
third variable, democracy important, is based 
on respondents’ answers to the following ques-
tion: “How important is it to live in a country 
that is governed democratically?” Respondents 
answered on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 indi-
cated that it is “not at all important” and 10 
indicated “absolutely important.”
The analysis examines variation across indi-
viduals. We link each individual to the histori-
cal characteristics of his/her ancestors using 
their country of residence and test whether a 
history of village democracy is associated with 
attitudes more supportive of democracy today. 
We estimate the following individual-level 
equation:
Table 2—Self-Reported Attitudes toward Democracy: Individual-Level OLS Estimates
Dependent variable
Democracy
better
Democratic 
political system
Democracy 
important
Democracy
better
Democratic 
political system
Democracy 
important
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean of dependent variable 3.23 3.36 8.54 3.23 3.36 8.54
Traditional local democracy 0.149** 0.118* 0.442** 0.141* 0.108 0.391*
(0.074) (0.068) (0.201) (0.075) (0.070) (0.225)
Agricultural suitability −0.141 −0.045 0.199 −0.152 −0.058 0.129
(0.139) (0.102) (0.358) (0.136) (0.106) (0.368)
Year sampled −0.047*** −0.012 −0.204*** −0.041** −0.005 −0.182***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.044) (0.018) (0.014) (0.052)
Population of European 0.000 −0.002** −0.004* 0.000 −0.002** −0.004
 descent (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Political hierarchies −0.015 −0.016 −0.050
(0.021) (0.016) (0.054)
Income fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 68 79 47 68 79 47
Observations 112,534 173,829 62,193 112,534 173,829 62,193
R2 0.017 0.029 0.024 0.018 0.030 0.025
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. “Traditional local democracy” is the estimated proportion of citizens whose 
ancestors appointed their local headman through either formal consensus or informal consensus. The variable ranges from 0 
to 1, with mean 0.383 and standard deviation 0.414. Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the country 
level. “Individual-level variables” include: a female indicator, age, age squared, a married indicator, education fixed effects, 
and income fixed effects.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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(1)  y ict =  α t + β Local democrac y c 
 +  X c  Ω +  X it Π +  ε ict ,
where i denotes an individual, c a country and 
t the survey wave. As before Local democracyc 
measures the proportion of a country’s residents 
with ancestors for which appointment of the 
local headman or chief occurred through a dem-
ocratic process.  X c    includes our set of baseline 
historical ethnographic variables also measured 
at the country level.  X
it
 denotes the following 
individual-level controls: a quadratic in age, 
gender, marital status, education attainment and 
income.5  αt indicates survey-wave fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Estimates of equation (1) are reported in 
Table 2. Columns 1–3 report estimates without 
the political hierarchies control, while columns 
5 The education categories are lower, middle, and upper. 
We include indicator variables for the middle and upper lev-
els. Income is measured by a variable that reports 11 catego-
ries. We include ten indicator variables, excluding the lowest 
income category. 
4–6 report estimates with this control. We find 
that for all three measures, a tradition of local 
democracy is associated with attitudes that 
are more favorable towards democracy at the 
national level.
For brevity, we do not report the coefficients 
for our individual-level covariates. We find that 
on average women tend to be less supportive 
of democracy and educated individuals more 
supportive.
C. Institutions and Income
Given the known positive association 
between democracy, institutional quality, and 
economic development, we now examine the 
cross-national relationship between traditional 
village democracy and current institutions and 
economic development. We measure domestic 
institutions using the “rule of law” and “con-
trol of corruption” measures from the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The variables range from −2.5 to +2.5 with a higher number indicating stronger 
rule of law and less corruption. We take the 
Table 3—Institutional Quality and Income: Country-Level OLS Estimates
Dependent variable
Rule of law
Control of 
corruption log (income) Rule of law
Control of 
corruption log (income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean of dependent variable −0.208 −0.166 7.376 −0.208 −0.166 7.376
Traditional local democracy 0.647*** 0.618*** 0.859*** 0.632*** 0.592*** 0.900***
(0.190) (0.193) (0.277) (0.191) (0.193) (0.280)
Agricultural suitability −0.200 −0.236 −1.066** −0.199 −0.235 −1.058**
(0.246) (0.231) (0.410) (0.248) (0.234) (0.415)
Year sampled −0.304*** −0.262*** −0.659*** −0.294*** −0.246*** −0.686***
(0.080) (0.073) (0.108) (0.080) (0.073) (0.114)
Population of European 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.023*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.024***
 descent (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Political hierarchies −0.023 −0.040 0.061
(0.042) (0.042) (0.053)
Observations 150 150 141 150 150 141
R2 0.38 0.39 0.51 0.38 0.39 0.52
Notes: The unit of analysis is a country. “Traditional local democracy” is the estimated proportion of citizens whose ancestors 
appointed  their local headman through either formal consensus or informal consensus. The variable ranges from 0 to 1, with 
mean 0.331 and standard deviation 0.412. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 average of the measures across all years avail-
able between 1996 and 2005. We also measure 
the average of real per capita GDP across these 
same periods.6
Estimates are reported in Table  3. As shown, 
we find a strong robust relationship between a 
tradition of local democracy and rule of law, 
control of corruption, and real per capita GDP. 
This is true whether or not we control for tra-
ditional state development, measured by the 
number of political hierarchies beyond the local 
community.
III. Conclusions
We have provided evidence that a history of 
democracy at the local level is associated with 
contemporary democracy at the national level. 
Auxiliary estimates show that a tradition of local 
democracy is also associated with attitudes that 
favor democracy, with better quality institutions, 
and higher level of economic development. The 
findings not only show persistence in demo-
cratic institutions over time but are also consis-
tent with national institutions being affected by 
local institutions. A likely mediating mechanism 
is individual beliefs and values about the appro-
priate national political structure. Individual 
beliefs are affected by traditional practices at the 
local level and are an important foundation for 
well-functioning national institutions.
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